Combating World's Corruption is a Slippery Business by Chodosh, Hiram
Combating world's corruption is a slippery business
By Hiram Chodosh 
Thursday, October 22, 2009
Beyond the word’s strict definition, corruption is difficult to measure. Einstein once observed 
that everything we can measure does not necessarily count, whereas everything that counts we 
cannot necessarily measure. The same is true of corruption. Why? 
Corruption is generally thought of as illicit activity, but gathering data based on such a definition 
can be difficult. It leaves us with mere proxies for any empirical understanding of how much 
corruption in a given area takes place.
Proxies for measuring the extent of corruption include reported allegations, cases, or convictions 
and survey data. Each can produce false negatives (a system appears clean but it is not) and 
false positives (perceptions of systemic corruption that are exaggerated, if not entirely 
incorrect). This is the major structural flaw of the index of Transparency International on 
corruption, which is based on the citizens’ perception. The other criteria are no less elusive. 
Reports of actual cases are difficult to evaluate. They tend to focus on big cases and rarely 
touch on the more common, smaller cases that do not rise to public attention or disclosure. The 
existence of such cases alone may indicate either the tip of the iceberg (reflecting deep-rooted, 
systemic corrupt behaviors) or in contrast that the system is working well by identifying and 
punishing exceptional, corrupt practices. Without more information, it is difficult to determine 
which of these inferences to draw. 
In particular, observers may attempt to draw inferences from the number of disciplinary actions 
that are reported. This is troublesome because the lack of disciplinary action may be indicative 
of a more serious problem, whereas a greater number of reported actions may reflect a strong 
and healthy commitment to eliminate corrupt practices.
For example, a survey of 21 countries in Asia revealed that out of 238 actions against judges for 
corruption, approximately half of the complaints generated no action. Most of the actions were 
for incompetence. Only a half dozen involved bribery or corruption.
Additionally, two-thirds of the countries involved the chief justice in the process, and most of 
those surveyed were satisfied with current procedures. The author concluded from this data 
that these systems were effective, observing positively that there is “not only one way to fight 
corruption effectively.” Alternatively, his survey may lead to a more negative conclusion, and a 
more correct one, that there are many ways to fight corruption ineffectively.  
Second, where evidence is unavailable or difficult to interpret, another strategy is simply to ask 
questions directly of officials or citizens through surveys. Surveys provide information that 
would otherwise be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Such data indicates how widespread 
the perception of corruption has become.
However, the surveys also carry a number of methodological weaknesses. First, those 
interviewed, if asked to compare domestic to foreign experience, have little basis for comparison 
to other national contexts. Second, they are increasingly aware of results of previous or other 
surveys and have a tendency to internalize those findings.
Third, the questions they are asked are either bluntly stated (in order to make them accessible) 
and either too imprecise or too detailed and technical. Fourth, surveyors may not be persuaded 
of the protections of confidentiality and may worry about retribution. And questions may not be 
objective or based on direct experience; instead, they lead to bias in the respondents, who in 
turn dismiss the extent of corruption or exaggerate its reach.
Beyond actual cases and surveys, scholars have begun to develop macro-quantitative and 
economic frameworks for identifying corruption, but these studies are in early stages of 
development for assessing the extent of many different kinds of corruption. 
Notwithstanding all of these concerns, it is vital to note that perception itself has an impact on 
corruption. Just as recent research has shown that there is a network effect on social conditions 
and behaviors, from happiness to obesity, the same is true of tax compliance and corruption. 
People who believe their neighbors do not pay taxes are less likely to do so. Likewise, persons 
who perceive corruption to be widespread or common are more likely to participate in corrupt 
practices. 
This underscores the need for developing better empirical techniques: more accurate and 
qualitative reporting, better survey methodologies, improvements of other macro-quantitative 
approaches – all tied together to triangulate competing truths on corruption by taking a more 
humble and rigorous approach to weaknesses of current methods. 
The better we can measure corruption, the more accurate will become our understanding of its 
reach and depth, as well as impacts. Without improving our methodologies, effective reforms 
will continue to rest on shaky empirical foundations. 
Professor Hiram E. Chodosh is dean of the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. 
He is a world expert on comparative law and author of “Global Justice Reform: A Comparative 
Methodology,” published in New York in 2005.
